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SESSION 9
EMERGING POLICY AND PRACTICE ISSUES
Steven L. Schooner  
Nash & Cibinic Professor of Government Procurement Law  
The George Washington University Law School 
I. THE POST-MILLENIUM PROCUREMENT SPENDING REDUCTION CONTINUES: 
IS THERE A PLATEAU ON THE HORIZON?
A. The New Economic Reality: Not So New Anymore. Procurement spending decreased 
significantly again last year. Although this is no surprise, some will take comfort that the rate of 
decrease appears to have slowed after the prior year’s dramatic sequester-induced plunge. Moreover, 
the downward trend feels increasingly familiar, with this being the sixth year of the federal procure-
ment spending decline.
B. Finding the Bottom (Below $500 Billion)? Regular attendees of this conference are 
familiar with this chapter’s coverage of the post-millennium federal procurement spending trend. 
The post-millennial binge (before the contraction) was significant not only for its longevity but 
for its size. Keep in mind that, in Fiscal Year 2001, federal procurement spending rose to just 
over $223 billion. The following years, in 2002 and 2003, we witnessed 18 and 20 percent spend-
ing increases. After steady increases in the middle of the decade, we reached an unprecedented 
plateau where federal procurement spending stabilized at approximately $540 billion from Fiscal 
Years 2008 through 2011. We now know that, in 2009, we experienced the first decrease in federal 
procurement spending for well over a decade (but it took a number of years for the data to catch 
up). Then, in 2013, it appears that we finally experienced the first dramatic decline in spending 
and a plunge below the (oh-so-dramatic) $500 billion threshold that the government exceeded 
from 2008 through 2012. Now, the search for the bottom – whether a plateau or reversal – contin-
ues. Frankly, nothing suggests that the government will again exceed the $500 billion threshold 
again anytime soon.
Using adjusted figures (yes, between the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) and USAS-
pending.gov, history is consistently being re-written), it appears that the annual increases in federal 
procurement were most dramatic from 2001 through 2008, cumulatively averaging more than three 
times the rate of inflation. The experts correctly predicted that the growth rate eventually would taper. 
In 2009, the rate slowed and, apparently, growth finally stalled. Yet, as discussed in past years, the 
dire warnings that the current spending binge was a blip – and that procurement spending would 
promptly retract – unfolded far more slowly than anyone expected. Indeed, the recently adjusted 
numbers paint a picture of extraordinary spending consistency – from 2008 through 2011 – that ap-
pears as quirky as it is accidental. 
The chart below summarizes this procurement spending cycle. The $540 billion plateau repre-
sented the high end of a robust and sustained growth curve. Time will tell how far the reductions 
will go and whether they can be sustained. But, if we broaden our thinking or redefine the pie 
we are describing, the bad news can be tempered. Accordingly, this year I’ve combined federal 
procurement and grant spending into a single chart (rather than viewing the two pies separately 
before combining them).
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Federal Procurement and Grant Spending 
2001-2014*
Fiscal Year
Procurement Spending  
(in Billions of $)
Grant Spending  
(in Billions of $)
2014 $443.3* $589.1*
2013 $462.4 $524.3
2012 $518.4 $539.5
2011 $539.6 $566.9
2010 $540.3 $614.3
2009 $540.5 $665.0
2008  $541.2 $419.7
2007 $469.3 $430.2
2006 $430.5 $490.0
2005 $391.2 $441.7
2004 $346.1 $450.1
2003 $318.0 $493.7
2002 $264.1 $406.3
2001 $223.0 $330.8
*FY 2014 figures reflect an estimate based upon preliminary reporting.
The total procurement spending amounts reported above, for every year, 2001-2013, 
changed by at least $100 million compared to last year’s USASpending reports.
See www.USASpending.gov. 
C. Data Quality. Ongoing analysis continues to cast doubt on these 
figures, but they still represent the most useful data set accessible in the 
public domain. See Agencies Underreport Contract Award Data Online, 
GAO Says, 56 GC ¶ 263 (GAO reports on “inconsistencies between the 
data on USASpending.gov and agency records....GAO estimates that only 
between two and seven percent of the awards contained information that 
was fully consistent with agencies’ records for data elements examined.”); 
GAO-14-476, Data Transparency: Oversight Needed to Address Underre-
porting and Inconsistencies on Federal Award Website, available at gao.gov/
assets/670/664536.pdf. Cynics might suggest that poor data quality is the 
norm in federal procurement, but that would be an unfair overstatement. 
See Agency Reporting Of Contractor Past Performance Could Be Improved, 
GAO Says, 56 GC ¶ 270 (“although agencies generally have improved 
their level of compliance with past performance reporting requirements, 
the rate of compliance varies widely by agency and most have not met 
OFPP targets. GAO found that the compliance rate ranged from 13 to 83 
percent as of April 2014.”); GAO-14-707, Contractor Performance: Actions 
Taken to Improve Reporting of Past Performance Information, available 
at www.gao.gov/assets/670/665238.pdf. 
D. The Chasm Between Contracts and Grants Begins to Shrink. 
Plenty of contracting experts assert that, fundamentally, not much dis-
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tinguishes a government contract from a federal grant. Many contractors 
also compete for and receive grants. Despite all of the attention focused 
upon (and burdensome oversight associated with) government contracting, 
grant spending continues to outpace procurement spending. The oversight 
and regulatory community appears to have woken up to this reality and 
is slowly shifting its focus from procurement to grants. Indeed, late in 
2013, the government announced a significant revamping of the regulatory 
regime surrounding grants. See Uniform Administrative Requirements, 
Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards, 78 Fed. Reg. 
78590 (Dec. 26, 2013) (amending and replacing 2 C.F.R. Chapter I, and 
Chapter II, Parts 200, 215, 220, 225, and 230), available at http://www.
gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-12-26/pdf/2013-30465.pdf. 
Consistent with the trend I’ve previously reported, grant spending ex-
ceeded procurement spending last year, as it has for twelve of the last four-
teen years. Moreover, while grant spending fell after peaking in FY2010, 
grants – unlike contracts – never fell below the $500 billion threshold. 
Moreover, the grant decline only lasted four years before climbing again, 
and the FY2014 increase was significant, vaulting grant spending to its 
third highest level ever.
E. Sound and Fury Proves Preferable to Sequestration. While 
once again the government spent less money last year (and most likely 
will continue to do so for the foreseeable future), the dramatic disruption 
of sequestration was not repeated. That should not suggest that everything 
was rosy in terms of the kind of stable funding that facilitates efficient, 
long-term investment decisions. See CSIS Finds DOD Contract Spend-
ing Growth Slows Under Sequestration, 56 GC ¶ 348 (“data show that a 
disproportionate share of the budget reductions under both the [Budget 
Control Act of 2011] and sequestration has been borne by contracts and 
by the defense industrial base.”), CSIS, supra; DOD Needs Better Cost-
Savings Estimates For Future Furloughs, 56 GC ¶ 207 (“DOD officials told 
GAO that the furlough caused a decline in morale and mission delays. 
GAO responded that attributing these impacts directly to the furlough is 
difficult because the civilian hiring and pay freezes also may have contrib-
uted to morale issues.”); GAO-14-529, Sequestration: Comprehensive and 
Updated Cost Savings Would Better Inform DOD Decision Makers If Future 
Civilian Furloughs Occur, available at www.gao.gov/assets/670/664142.
pdf. See also, Sarah E. Kahn & C. Kevin Kobbe, Defense Industry M&A 
In The Wake Of The BCA Passage And Sequestration--Avoiding Pitfalls 
In A Distressed Deal Context, 56 GC ¶ 147 (“current environment sug-
gests that a buyer’s market is generally shaping up in defense industry 
M&A (excepting certain businesses such as those in the UAV space)”); 
Funding Instability Undermines DHS Acquisition Management, 56 GC ¶ 
158 (“short-term budget decisions continue to supersede a more strategic 
approach to prioritizing the department’s acquisitions”).
Unfortunately, nothing suggests that, after the mid-term elections and 
the resulting increase in Republican legislative control, that Congress and 
the President see eye-to-eye on budgeting going forward. It is simply too 
early to tell what next year will bring. Still, at least for now, this bizarre 
equilibrium – a bipartisan distaste for another shutdown – contributes to 
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some amount of short-term budget stability. Of course, there are always 
scenarios that could generate surges in procurement spending, but they 
tend to be associated with events (such as terrorism and war, natural 
disasters, or economic crises) that, at the moment, appear less attractive 
than belt-tightening.
II. GOVERNMENT-WIDE (OR, NOT JUST DEFENSE) POLICY? 
A. New OFPP Administrator for the New Year. The Executive Office 
has a (relatively) new procurement policy czar, with Administrator Anne 
Rung now in place at the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP). 
Rung brings considerable experience from GSA and the Commerce Depart-
ment, as well as experience gained at the state level with Pennsylvania’s 
Department of General Services. Late in the year, Rung offered a glimpse 
of her priorities with the publication of an ambitious, wide-ranging articu-
lation of initiatives and aspirations. See OFPP Guidance Aims For Federal 
Contracting Innovations, 56 GC ¶ 396, discussing OFPP Memorandum, 
Transforming the Marketplace: Simplifying Federal Procurement to Improve 
Performance, Drive Innovation, and Increase Savings (December 4, 2014). 
In the memo, Administrator’s Rung discusses, among other things:
• Buying As One Through Category Management: “There is a 
critical need for a new paradigm for purchasing that moves from managing 
purchases and price individually across thousands of procurement units 
to managing entire categories of common spend and total cost through 
category management … [so] that agencies get the same competitive price 
and quality of performance when they are buying similar commodities 
under similar circumstances[.]” To the extent that the Strategic Sourcing 
Leadership Council (SSLC) helps agencies reduce contract duplication, 
efficiency should be increased. I am less sanguine about the belief that 
collecting and distributing “prices paid” for anything other than commodi-
ties will benefit the government in the long run, and it raises particular 
concerns with regard to services.
• Deploying Talent and Tools Across Agencies and Growing 
Talent Within Agencies to Drive Innovation. Kudos to Rung for ac-
knowledging that the government “must embrace practices that encour-
age new and better ways of thinking[.]” That’s a given. It would also be 
refreshing to “instill a culture that rewards creativity.” And I’m ecstatic 
to see the new OFPP administrator focus on “cross-functional training, 
rotational development and assignments, and effective training and edu-
cation used by the private sector.”
• Detouring from the memorandum, it was a surprisingly quiet 
year in terms of efforts to invest in the acquisition workforce, 
which is not good news. None of the long-standing, systemic 
concerns discussed annually in this chapter were addressed, not 
is there reason for optimism in the current budgetary environ-
ment. See, generally, CRS Focuses On Workforce, Incentives As 
Keys To DOD Acquisition Reform, 56 GC ¶ 196 (“[T]he incentives 
in the acquisition process, analysts argue, encourage people to 
make poor decisions”); CRS Report R43566, Defense Acquisi-
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tion Reform: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress, 
available at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R43566.pdf.
• Building Stronger Vendor Relationships. This one should 
be fun to watch, particularly since the government struggles with the 
concept and often invests significant energy discouraging and deterring 
the kinds of behavior that create and sustain meaningful relationships 
between government customers and private industry. It is encouraging to 
hear the Administrator adopt the aspirations of her predecessor’s Myth-
Busting campaign with the message: “Early, frequent, and constructive 
engagement with industry leads to better outcomes.”
• As suggested previously however, it seems disingenuous for the 
White House to suggest a correlation between procurement-policy-related 
moves and “savings” to the taxpayers. OFPP (and the White House) may 
be pleased that “contract spending decreased by over $55 billion in Fiscal 
Year 2013 from the prior year – part of a four-year decrease in the cost of 
Federal contracting.” Yet readers understandably may become confused 
where the memo suggests that Administration “efforts are paying off[.]” 
The memo lumps “steps to strengthen Federal acquisition practices to 
improve efficiency [and] reduce red-tape ... [and] new efforts to pool the 
Government’s buying power through strategic sourcing, and ... other smart 
buying strategies” together in a sentence with “cut[ting] contracts that 
are no longer necessary or affordable....” And, yes, indeed, the government 
spent less on supplies and services in 2013. But, empirically, history will 
more likely reflect that a shortage of funds (and sequestration) was the 
dominant factor behind the reduced spending, rather than any combina-
tion of strategic procurement reforms.
B. A Note On Transitions: Last year, Joe Jordan was in the process 
of leaving the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) and joining 
FedBid as President of Public Sector. In retrospect, his timing may have 
proven suboptimal. VHA Reverse Auctions Suffer From Poor Documenta-
tion, Unreliable Savings, FSS Conflicts, 56 GC ¶ 319; VA Office of the 
Inspector General, Review of the Veterans Health Administration’s Use 
of Reverse Auction Acquisitions (September 26, 2014), available at www.
va.gov/oig/pubs/VAOIG-13-01408-294.pdf; see also, VA Office of the In-
spector General, Administrative Investigation Conduct Prejudicial to the 
Government and Interference of a VA Official for the Financial Benefit of 
a Contractor Veterans Health Administration Procurement & Logistics Of-
fice Washington, DC (September 26, 2014), available at http://www.va.gov/
oig/pubs/VAOIG-13-03065-304.pdf; Christian Davenport, VA contracting 
official misused her position to help company, inspector general finds, 
WashInGton Post (October 5, 2014); Andy Medici, IG: VA official gamed 
system to benefit FedBid, federal tImes (September 29, 2014), available 
at http://archive.federaltimes.com/article/20140929/MGMT04/309290022/
IG-VA-official-gamed-system-benefit-FedBid.
C. Another Challenge Ahead: One of the most significant challenges 
for OFPP is to somehow realign itself with the defense acquisition policy 
discussion and community. Far too often, OFPP and DoD policy documents 
and, more broadly, policies, seem uncoordinated and inconsistent. In the 
long run, this divide must be bridged. (I return to DoD below.)
9-5
NOTES
© 2015 Thomson Reuters
 D. Executive Order Bonanza. Immediately upon his inauguration, 
President Obama demonstrated a strong interest in Executive Orders 
(EO’s) and did not hesitate to deploy them in the procurement arena. The 
administration returned its attention to EO’s last year. Only time will 
tell how active this approach remains for the duration of the President’s 
second term. As discussed elsewhere in these materials, the EO activity 
included:
• Prohibiting Federal Contractors from Discriminating 
Against Employees Based on Sexual Orientation. EO 
13672, Further Amendments to Executive Order 11478, Equal 
Employment Opportunity in the Federal Government, and 
Executive Order 11246, Equal Employment Opportunity, avail-
able at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-07-23/pdf/2014-
17522.pdf. See DOL Issues Final Rule Prohibiting Discrimina-
tion Based On Sexual Orientation, 56 GC ¶ 402 (“prohibits 
federal contractors and federally assisted construction contrac-
tors and subcontractors that do over $10,000 in Government 
business in one year from discriminating in employment deci-
sions on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, 
gender identity or national origin”); President Signs Order 
Barring LGBT Discrimination By Federal Contractors, 56 GC ¶ 
246 (“expands EO 11246, signed by President Johnson, and EO 
11478, signed by President Nixon, to prohibit federal contrac-
tors from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation or 
gender identity”); 79 Fed. Reg. 20749 (July 21, 2014) (“uniform 
policy for the Federal Government to prohibit discrimination … 
based on sexual orientation and gender identity”); Lawmakers 
Call For Executive Order Banning LGBT Discrimination, 56 
GC ¶ 102.
• Raising the Minimum Wage for Federal Contractors. DOL 
Issues Final Rule On Contractor Minimum Wage, 56 GC ¶ 329 
(“On October 1, the Department of Labor issued a final rule 
implementing Executive Order 13658 and raising the minimum 
wage for workers on federal construction and service contracts 
to $10.10 per hour. See 79 Fed. Reg. 60633 (Oct. 7, 2014). In 
future years, the minimum wage will be indexed to inflation.”); 
PSC Calls For Clarifying Proposed Contractor Minimum Wage 
Rule, 56 GC ¶ 258; 56 GC ¶ 210(a); President Sets Contractor 
Employee Minimum Wage, 56 GC ¶ 57 (including a potentially 
mixed message that: “Raising the pay of low-wage workers in-
creases their morale and the productivity and quality of their 
work, lowers turnover and its accompanying costs, and reduces 
supervisory costs” while the order is intended “to increase ef-
ficiency and cost savings in the work performed by parties who 
contract with the Federal Government”); 56 GC ¶ 36(d).
• Prohibiting Contractor Retaliation for Employee Disclo-
sure of Compensation. EO 13665, 79 Fed. Reg. 20749 (April 
11, 2014), memo available at www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/04/08/presidential-memorandum-advancing-pay-
equality-through-compensation-data; http://www.whitehouse.
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gov/the-press-office/2014/04/08/executive-order-non-retaliation-
disclosure-compensation-information; Executive Order Protects 
Contractor Employees’ Right To Discuss Pay Information, 56 GC 
¶ 116 (requiring contractors to allow disclosure of compensation 
levels without retaliation to battle sex discrimination, and direct-
ing the Department of Labor to propose a rule to require reporting 
of summary compensation data broken down by sex and race). 
• Requiring Consideration of Labor Law Compliance as 
an Aspect of the Contracting Officer’s Responsibility 
Determination. EO 13673, Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces, 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-08-05/pdf/2014-18561.
pdf; 79 Fed. Reg. 45309 (Aug. 5, 2014); Executive Order Tar-
gets Contractor Compliance With Labor Laws, 56 GC ¶ 266 
(President Obama “issued an executive order, requiring pro-
spective contractors to disclose violations of labor laws in the 
last three years. Contracting officers will consider the disclo-
sures in responsibility determinations.”); 56 GC ¶ 373(e) (“EO 
13673 requires prospective Government contractors to disclose 
‘whether there has been any administrative merits determina-
tion, arbitral award or decision, or civil judgment ... against 
the offeror within the preceding 3-year period for violations 
of ’ labor laws.”).
E. The Next Round of Congressional Acquisition Reform? Con-
gress seems significantly interested in reforming federal acquisition, but 
it is unclear what direction, if any, Congress will take. Congress Passes 
2015 Defense Authorization Act, 56 GC ¶ 400; House Democrats Propose 
Defense Acquisition Reforms, 56 GC ¶ 340 (“five principles underlying 
[the New Democrat Coalition (NDC)] proposals are ending sequestration, 
making the Government a better customer to industry, empowering and 
growing the DOD acquisition workforce, improving management and 
accountability, and changing the culture for long-term success”); DOD 
Acquisition Reform Continues, Has Room To Grow, Witnesses Tell House 
Committee, 56 GC ¶ 226; House Committee Considers Future Of DOD Ac-
quisition Reform, 56 GC ¶ 216; Mike Schaengold & Jack Deschauer, The 
Impact Of The National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2014 
On Federal Procurement, 56 GC ¶ 50.
The most intriguing initiative, however, derived from the Senate Per-
manent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI), which issued its bipartisan 
report, Defense Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here? A Com-
pendium of Views by Leading Experts (October 2, 2014). The document 
collects more than thirty short essays from knowledgeable defense acqui-
sition professionals with a broad range of backgrounds and perspectives. 
The Subcommittee suggested that certain common themes emerged and 
noted that (with emphasis added):
• Nearly half of the experts feel that cultural change is required 
while over two-thirds believe improving incentives for the ac-
quisition workforce is necessary for reform.
• Two-thirds of the contributors feel that training and recruiting 
of the acquisition workforce must be improved.
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• Nearly half believe that DOD needs to attain realistic require-
ments at the start of a major acquisition program that includes 
budget-informed decisions.
• More than half of the submissions noted the need for strong 
accountability and leadership throughout the life-cycle of a 
weapon system – with several experts stating the need to fur-
ther integrate the Service Chiefs into the acquisition process.
After the essays, the document includes an interesting appendix, which 
correlates the various authors and topics in a series of matrices. The ini-
tial matrix identifies all of the authors (on the y-axis) and indicates the 
areas they emphasized on an alphabetical list of fourteen potential topics 
(on the x-axis). Consistent with the four initial findings, above, response 
rates across the fourteen topics (indicated in italics, below) varied from:
• Additional workforce training needed and Attract and retain 
quality workforce - both garnering over 70 percent; to
• Refine Goldwater-Nichols – which came in at under twenty-
three percent.
For the subsequent matrices, essay authors were organized by topics 
or interests, including:
• Acquisition Policy – of these, one hundred percent empha-
sized Additional workforce training needed and Attract and 
retain quality workforce, and fewer than fifteen percent empha-
sized Refine Goldwater-Nichols (and a number of other issues); 
• Budgeting and Resource Allocation – This was one of only 
two subgroups in which more than fifty percent emphasized 
improving the budget process. No one in this group, however, 
emphasized Prototyping/concurrency risk, and only one em-
phasized Testing/“Fly Before You Buy.”
• Culture and Accountability – a quick review of the partici-
pants suggest that to see a meaningful trend, the report drafters 
should have separated “culture” and “accountability.”
• Procurement Policy – I find it surprising that experts and 
analysts can confidently distinguish between acquisition policy 
and procurement policy! This group, more than any other, em-
phasized Encourag[ing] Innovation.
• Requirements Process - Only twenty percent of this group 
emphasized Attain realistic cost estimates early in the process.
F. Protests On the Rise, Again? The number of bid protest in FY2014 
was up five percent from FY2013. Readers may recall that the numbers 
dropped, slightly, the preceding year, when compared to FY2012. The 2014 
numbers seem to suggest that the 2013 reduction was an outlier in the 
general trend rather than a signal that bid protests are on the decline. 
GAO Bid Protest Annual Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 2014, GAO-
15-256SP (indicating that the number of new protests rose to 2,561 in 
FY2014, up five percent from FY 2013, and exceeding the most recent 
high of 2,475 from FY 2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/
GAO-15-256SP. Granted, the most unique and memorable aspect of this 
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year’s report was GAO’s detailing the mere thirty-nine cases which it was 
unable to resolve within the standard 100 days of when the protest was 
filed. Sequestration and shut-down delays ranged from two to sixteen 
days, which, objectively, represents far less disruption than many other 
government instrumentalities experienced.
Readers interested in these issues should also follow the recent analy-
sis of empirical data to understand the GAO bid protest regime. See, e.g., 
CRS Surveys GAO Bid Protest Procedures And CICA Stays Of Performance, 
56 GC ¶ 338, CRS No. R40228, GAO Bid Protests: An Overview of Time 
Frames and Procedures, available at fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40228.pdf; 
Jerald S. Howe, Jr., Feature Comment: Agency Corrective Action Remains 
The Dominant Theme – An Analysis Of GAO’s Bid Protest Statistics, 56 
GC ¶ 385 (“In examining the statistics for FY 2013, the biggest takeaway 
had to be the high (both relatively and absolutely) incidence of agency 
corrective action, and that is the headline again this year.”); Daniel I. 
Gordon, Feature Comment: Avoiding Bid Protests: Some Advice To Agency 
Counsel, 56 GC ¶ 244 (noting, among other things, that “more than 99.2 
percent of federal procurements, large and small, move forward without 
ever being protested”); Jerald S. Howe, Jr., Feature Comment: The Most 
Prevalent Reason Why GAO Sustained Bid Protests In FY 2013, 56 GC 
¶ 225 (The “most prevalent reason that [GAO] sustained bid protests in 
fiscal year 2013 was an agency’s flawed evaluation of a technical proposal 
or an otherwise flawed technical evaluation [, which]... was the basis for 
a sustained decision in at least half of the sustained decisions ... [and] 
protests (counted by B-number) sustained by those decisions.”]; Daniel 
I. Gordon, Feature Comment: Dissecting GAO’s Bid Protest ‘Effectiveness 
Rate’, 56 GC ¶ 25 (“in undertaking corrective action, contracting agen-
cies frequently take actions that give the protesters fair consideration for 
award of the contested contract or order. Voluntary corrective action by 
agencies thus often translates into prompt resolution of complaints about 
the way procurements were handled, and, in what some may see as a sur-
prisingly high percentage of the cases, leads to the protesters obtaining 
the contract or order.”); GAO Bid Protest Filings Decrease Slightly in FY 
2013, 56 GC ¶ 10 (“case filings decreased slightly over FY 2012, which 
set a 10-year high”).
G. Another Complex Year In Small Business. The banner headline 
in 2014 for the small business community was the unusual achievement 
of the Congressionally-mandated twenty-three percent goal for small 
business participation. Government Meets Small Business Goal For First 
Time In Eight Years, 56 GC ¶ 262 (Conversely, “[t]he Government fell short 
of its small business subcontracting goal of 36 percent; it awarded 34.0 
percent of FY 2013 contracting dollars to small business subcontractors, 
up from 33.6 percent in FY 2012. The Government missed its three- and 
five-percent goals for Historically Underutilized Business Zone firms 
and women-owned small businesses; respectively, it awarded 1.76 and 
4.32 percent to HUBZone firms and WOSBs. The Government met its 
three- and five-percent goals for service-disabled veteran-owned small 
businesses and small disadvantaged businesses; respectively, it awarded 
3.38 and 8.61 percent to SDVOSBs and SDBs.”)
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• Small business advocates and critics will find many issues to 
consider. Agencies Overstate Small Business Contract Dollars Awarded, 
IG Finds, 56 GC ¶ 320 (“FPDS-NG controls do not prevent contracting 
officers from incorrectly designating 8(a) and HUBZone contract awards 
to ineligible firms”); SBA OIG 14-48, Agencies Are Overstating Small Dis-
advantaged Business and HUBZone Goaling Credit by Including Contracts 
Performed by Ineligible Firms, available at www.sba.gov/sites/default/
files/oig/Agencies_Are_Overstating_SDB_and HUBZone_Goaling_Credit.
pdf; SBA Faces Challenges In Small Business Contracting, 8(a) Program 
Graduation, Acquisition Management, 56 GC ¶ 345; SBA OIG report avail-
able at www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/oig/SBA OIG Report 15-01 - FY 
2015 Management Challenges_0.pdf; 8(a) Monitoring Compliance Needs 
Improvement, GAO Says, 56 GC ¶ 305 (“COs generally did not collect in-
formation on the amount of subcontracted work performed under the 8(a) 
contracts reviewed”); GAO, 8(a) Subcontracting Limitations: Continued 
Noncompliance with Monitoring Requirements Signals Need for Regulatory 
Change, available at gao.gov/assets/670/665827.pdf; GAO Urges Agencies 
To Better Measure Small Business Participation In Strategic Sourcing, 56 
GC ¶ 63 (“[B]ecause strategic sourcing can reduce the number of available 
contracting opportunities, some members of the small business commu-
nity are concerned that small businesses may be negatively affected.”); 
GAO-14-126, Strategic Sourcing: Selected Agencies Should Develop Per-
formance Measures on Inclusion of Small Businesses and OMB Should 
Improve Monitoring, available at www.gao.gov/assets/670/660322.pdf. 
House Subcommittee Surveys SBA Outreach To Underserved Communities, 
56 GC ¶ 85 (“there are concerns as to whether underserved communities 
are receiving adequate access to [SBA] programs”); CRS Outlines Con-
tinuing HUBZone Fraud Risks, 56 GC ¶ 2 (“It remains to be determined 
if the SBA’s new processes will reduce the incidence of fraud within the 
program[.]”), www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41268.pdf. 
III. DOD PURCHASING TRENDS: DATA, ANALYSIS,  
OBSERVATION, AND SPECULATION.
A. A Wealth of Data on DoD Contract Spending. What Can We 
Learn? While the government dutifully plugs data into its mandatory 
databases, such as FPDS and USASpending, discussed above, others 
continue to engage in analysis that generates more sophisticated data to 
provide better insights into how the federal government’s procurement 
dollars are spent. CBO Surveys Steady Rise In DOD Acquisition Budget, 
56 GC ¶ 388 (CBO reports that DOD “acquisition appropriations grew 
by 25 percent between fiscal years 2000 and 2014, while the overall base 
budget grew by 31 percent during that period....”), available at www.cbo.
gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/49764-MilitarySpending.pdf. 
Long-time readers of this chapter will join me in bemoaning the loss of 
David Bertau’s wisdom and insights at this conference, while applauding 
the government’s good sense in recruiting him as the Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness. See, e.g., David J. Berteau, 
Jesse Ellman, Gregory Sanders & Rhys McCormick, U.S. Department of 
Defense Contract Spending and the Supporting Industrial Base, 2000– 
2013, A Report of the CSIS National Security Program on Industry and 
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Resources (October 2014), available at https://csis.org/files/publica-
tion/140929_Ellman_DefenseContractSpending2013_Web.pdf. After the 
sequestration smoke cleared, and viewing the thirteen-year trend (2000-
2013) in defense spending, CSIS observed, among other things:
• The Army and Navy boom years appear to have run their course. 
The Army and Navy’s slices of the defense procurement pie have returned 
to the shares seen before the escalation related to the Iraq/Afghanistan 
efforts. Contract obligations under sequestration dropped by twenty-one 
percent for the Army and twenty-two percent for the Air Force. During 
2012, Army contract obligations declined by fifteen percent.
• In 2000–2002, the Air Force dominated defense acquisition, ac-
counting for 28 percent of DoD’s contractual obligations. Since then, the 
Air Force’s share of the pie has declined steadily. 
• In 2008, for the first time – and in every year since, the Defense 
Logistics Agency (DLA) and “Other DoD” accounted for a larger 
share of contractual obligations than the Air Force. (“Other DoD” 
includes DoD’s contracting entities including the Missile Defense 
Agency (MDA), TRICARE, and U.S. Transportation Command). 
• The trends in contract type have ebbed and flowed, but they have 
not changed dramatically.
• Throughout the thirteen-year period, the balance between cost 
reimbursement and fixed price contracts remained relatively 
steady. To the extent there had been a slight recent trend toward 
fixed price contracts – rising from 60 percent, and peaking at 
about 68 percent (and away from cost-reimbursement vehicles, 
which at one point reached a low of twenty-eight percent), that 
trend was reversed under sequester, with cost-reimbursement 
contracts representing approximately 30 percent of contract 
dollars obligated.
• Criticism and focus on time and materials (T&M) contracting 
took their toll. After accounting for significant sums of contract 
obligations between 2006 and 2010, T&M contract obligations 
plummeted during the 2009–2012 budget drawdown and se-
questration. (The Army and Air Force were most concentrated 
sources for this decline, primarily in engineering and technical 
services and maintenance work.) Currently at a thirteen-year 
low, T&M’s share of overall defense contract obligations was 
only two percent in 2012, and fell to an almost statistically 
insignificant one percent in 2013.
• We have been aware, for some time, that services dominate the 
defense procurement landscape, and that has not dramatically changed. 
But the mix has not remained entirely stable.
• After peaking in 2008, products declined faster than services 
(excluding R&D – more on that below). The recent apparent re-
duction in product purchasing, however, is inflated (or appears 
overly dramatic) because it follows an anomalous one-year DLA 
fuel purchasing binge in 2012. 
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• Services contracts were not disproportionately cut, except for 
time and materials contracts (discussed above). Obligations for 
services basically declined at the same rate of overall spending. 
(This may appear surprising, given the Obama administration 
and Congressional efforts to reduce the service contractor FTE 
(full-time-equivalent) headcount, the government’s reliance 
on service contractors or, as some might suggest “insource.”) 
Indeed CSIS concluded that service contract obligations actu-
ally declined more slowly than the DoD average between 2012 
and 2013.
• At the top, however, the picture looked quite different. 
Under sequestration, the six largest defense contrac-
tors experienced a nineteen percent decline in services 
contract obligations.
• Other than R&D (discussed at length below,) the most 
pronounced reductions in the services sector were ob-
served with regard to equipment- and facilities-related 
services and construction.
• On a related note, see DOD Contracted Services Inven-
tory Provides Limited Information, GAO Finds, 56 GC ¶ 
386 (“GAO found that military departments ‘generally 
do not have plans to use the inventories for strategic 
workforce planning, workforce mix and insourcing deci-
sions, or budget and programming decisions.’”), GAO-
15-88, Defense Contractors: Additional Actions Needed 
to Facilitate the Use of DOD’s Inventory of Contracted 
Services, available at www.gao.gov/assets/670/667059.
pdf. 
• The most startling – and, in the long-term, potentially troubling 
– story relates to research and development (R&D): 
• CSIS reported that: “In absolute terms, DoD in 2013 obligated 
less for R&D contracts than in any year since 2001.”
• After R&D contract obligations fell by eleven percent in 2012, 
R&D spending declined by another twenty-one percent under 
sequestration. That drop was fifty percent more severe than the 
average decline experienced by DoD in 2013.
• Moreover, Defense R&D contract obligations had been declin-
ing steadily since 2009, yet, under sequestration, the decline 
appeared both quantitatively and qualitatively different. CSIS 
quotes Frank Kendall’s September 5, 2013 Federal News Radio 
prediction that: “If we’re talking about an overall budget cut of 
10 percent across the department, you can about double that 
for the R&D….” CSIS concludes that the most recent decline is 
“broad-based and not primarily tied to a few large development 
programs.”
• In other words, neither “cancellation [n]or maturation into 
procurement account funding of major programs” accounts for 
the R&D spending decline. Instead, CSIS concluded that the 
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cuts fell on “the stages of R&D that are critical to identifying 
and developing future critical technologies….” (The exception 
is that the gradual cancellation of the future combat system 
(FCS) accounts for the lion’s share of the Army’s decline in R&D 
contract spending between 2009 and 2012.)
• CSIS isolated the most steep declines in what it refers to as 
mid-to-late-stage R&D, which includes: advanced technology 
development , advanced component development and proto-
types, and systems development and demonstration.
• One ray of sunshine snuck through the clouds. Sequestration 
appears to have reversed the trend, most pronounced from 
2009 to 2012 (which is consistent with the Better Buying Power 
initiatives) toward more fixed-price contracting for R&D.
• A remarkable degree of stability can be found among DoD’s 20 
largest contractors in the new millennium. 
• Lockheed Martin and Boeing held the top two spots in 2003 and 
2013. General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon 
rounded out the top five, but their positions have changed. CSIS 
points out Northrup Grumman’s divestiture of Huntington In-
galls Industries (ranked seventh in 2013) as the most significant 
anomaly.
• Other contractors which have moved between the sixth and 
twentieth positions during that period include Dyncorp, Gen-
eral Electric, Health Net, Humana, ITT, L3 Communications, 
SAIC, and United Technologies.
• With the V-22’s increasingly popularity, the Bell-Boeing Joint 
Project Office recently cracked DoD’s top twenty. For leisure 
reading, consider Steven L. Schooner & Nathaniel Castellano, 
Review Essay: Reading the dream maChIne: the Untold storY 
of the notorIoUs v-22 osPreY, by Richard Whittle, in Light of 
the Defense Acquisition Performance Study, 43 PUBlIC ContraCt 
laW JoUrnal 391 (2014). General Atomics also found itself on 
the list. See, generally, rIChard WhIttle, Predator: the seCret 
orIGIns of the drone revolUtIon (2014).
• The smallest contracts represent a smaller share of contract dol-
lars, while the largest contacts have gained or absorbed a more significant 
share. CSIS observed that, under sequester, all sizes except the largest 
contracts experienced significant cuts. (Here’s where statistics can be 
tricky. Elsewhere in these materials, authors have noted that, last year, the 
government – for the first time in ages – achieved the statutory twenty-
three percent goal for small business participation. Of course, the total 
number of contract dollars awarded to small business decreased; small 
businesses simply enjoyed a slightly larger piece of a dramatically reduced 
pie.) 
B. Change at the Top: Defense Policy and Aspiration. Last year 
at this time, we noted that Deputy Secretary of Defense Aston (Ash) B. 
Carter, formerly USD(AT&L), announced he would step down at the end 
of 2013. Now he returns as the Secretary of Defense. Many will remem-
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ber Carter as the driving force behind the original Better Buying Power 
(BBP) initiative. See, e.g., http://bbp.dau.mil/. Of course, BBP continues 
to evolve. BBP 2.0 offered more palatable themes, including encouraging 
the acquisition workforce to think, emphasizing the importance of a qual-
ity acquisition workforce and professionalism, and suggested a return 
to fundamental acquisition principles (including effective incentives to 
industry[;] ... understanding and active management of technical risk[;] 
... demonstrated progress before major commitments; ... and … using the 
right contract type of the job). USD(AT&L) Frank Kendall’s BBP 3.0 took 
a surprising turn, tilted heavily toward the micro rather than the macro, 
increasing the number of bullet points and reducing the size of the font 
on the summary Power Point slide. In many ways, BBP 3.0 feels more 
like a catch-all or a DoD-wide acquisition improvement wish list. Few 
topics disappeared, and many appear to have been added. Apparently in 
an effort to create a unifying theme or maintain some level of focus, two 
themes are trumpeted on the busy summary slide:
• Achieving Dominant Capabilities through Technical Excellence 
and Innovation; and
• Continue Strengthening Our Culture of Cost Consciousness, 
Professionalism, and Technical Excellence
Once the reader dives into the small print, BBP 3.0 emphasizes, among 
other things: 
• Affordability caps and “should cost”
• Employing appropriate contract types and increased use of 
incentives
• Increased focus on (and control over) IR&D
• Increased use of draft technical specifications (and, hopefully, 
RFP’s)
• Increased tradecraft in services
• Requirements definition
• Post-award contract management 
Still waiting for the paradigm shift. Despite the post-millennium 
experience, BPP 3.0 does not appear to contain a silver bullet for enhanc-
ing the efficiency of future contingency contracting. DOD Needs To Plan 
For Contractor Support As Key Part Of Contingency Operations, DSB 
Says, 56 GC ¶ 269 (DSB “task force criticized DOD senior leadership 
for its continued failure to recognize [operational contract support] as 
critical to combat readiness [despite] ‘years of discussion of controversial 
contract management issues, Congressional interest, numerous studies, 
and bureaucratic actions.’”); Defense Science Board, Contractor Logistics 
in Support of Contingency Operations, available at www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/
reports/CONLOG_Final_Report_17Jun14.pdf.
C. DoD Continues Its Effort to Analyze Metrics. Last year, these 
materials suggested that the most thought-provoking reading of the year 
was found in DoD’s nascent performance, outcome, or metrics, initiative. 
AT&L Issues First Defense Acquisition System Performance Report, 55 
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GC ¶ 214, available at http://bbp.dau.mil/doc/Report_on_the_Perfor-
mance_of_the_Def_Acq_System.pdf. Fortunately, DoD followed up with 
a second report, and I hope we will see a third in 2015. AT&L Releases 
Second Annual DOD Acquisition Assessment, 56 GC ¶ 208; Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Perfor-
mance of the Defense Acquisition System: 2014 Annual Report, available 
at bbp.dau.mil/docs/Performance-of-Defense-Acquisition-System-2014.pdf. 
DoD has not received much credit for this effort and, surprisingly, 
seems to be generating more criticism than praise. That is a shame, 
because the reports are chock-full of intriguing observations and conclu-
sions. Sure, there is room for improvement, but it seems wrong to focus 
exclusively on what the report could or should (eventually) do, rather than 
recognize that the first two reports remain a quantum leap forward in 
terms of transparency, analysis, and fodder for critical assessment. Like 
its predecessor, this is a lengthy, highly detailed report, with nuggets that 
should interest everyone. Against that backdrop, some highlights of the 
second report include:
• Not all incentives work. DoD concedes that contractual 
incentives are effective only if (1) the incentives are actually 
used; (2) the incentives are significant, stable, and predictable; 
and (3) the incentives are tied directly to DoD objectives. 
• “Cost-plus versus fixed-price” is a red herring. DoD ex-
plains that the emphasis should be on matching incentives to 
the situation at hand instead of expecting fixed-price contract-
ing to serves as a “magic bullet.”
• Incentive Fee Contracting - CPIF and FPIF. DoD’s data 
indicates that these contract types control cost, price, and sched-
ule as well as, or better than, other types—and with generally 
lower margins. 
• Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) Contracting requires knowledge 
of actual costs. DoD explains that these “contracts provide 
vendors a strong incentive to control costs, especially in pro-
duction, … [but] taxpayers do not share in those cost savings, 
unless the negotiated price took into account actual prior costs 
and margins, as well as the contractor’s anticipated ability to 
continue cost reduction. [Accordingly], to use FFP contracts 
effectively, [DoD] must fully understand actual costs when 
negotiating subsequent production lots.” 
• Competition is effective—But only when viable. The good 
news is that DoD’s data confirms that “[c]ompeted contracts 
perform better on cost, price, and schedule growth than new 
sole-sourced or one-bidder contracts in development.…Unfor-
tunately, direct competition on some MDAP contracts is often 
not viable – especially in production, where significant entry 
costs, technical data rights, or infrastructure may be barriers....”
Hopefully, the acquisition, oversight, budgeting, and planning commu-
nities will applaud DoD’s efforts. Meanwhile these materials will continue 
to encourage DoD to evolve past a fascination with our longstanding, gen-
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erally unhelpful, and popular-primarily-because-they’re-easy-to-measure 
metrics (price, schedule, performance specifications) associated with the 
award – rather than the outcome – of the contract. Specifically, increased 
attention to quantifying more meaningful measures such as life cycle 
cost, bang for the buck, value for money spent, and customer satisfaction 
obtained would be a step in the right direction.
Meanwhile, early data and analysis suggests that the most recent 
Congressional effort to manage the process has not proven itself as the 
proverbial silver bullet. 
CRS Analyzes DOD Weapon System Acquisitions, Reform Options, 56 
GC ¶ 198 (“Concerns over defense acquisitions generally center around 
significant cost overruns, schedule delays, and an inability to provide troops 
in the field with equipment they need when they need it”); WSARA, BBP 
Helped DOD Improve Procurement, But More Work Remains, Witnesses 
Say, 56 GC ¶ 148 (CRS’s Moshe Schwartz indicated: ‘a number of analysts 
believe that [WSARA] is having a positive effect,’ but its full effect ‘may 
not be felt until the next generation of weapon systems are in production’ 
because of how recently the statute was enacted”).
 No doubt, there will plenty for us to discuss in 2015.
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